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CHINA’S GLOBAL NAVAL STRATEGY AND  
EXPANDING FORCE STRUCTURE
Pathway to Hegemony
James E. Fanell
This article is derived from Captain Fanell’s testimony at the hearing before the U.S. House of 
Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on May 17, 2018. The full text  
of his original testimony more forcefully reflects his admonitions to the committee, and it is  
available online at https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/james_e._fanell_hpsci 
_testimony_-_final_-_17may18.pdf.
 China’s unilateral expansion into and through the international waters within the first island chain—or what Beijing now calls China’s Blue Territories—
over the past six years has altered the strategic balance of power dramatically in 
the Indo-Pacific region�1 That strategic balance has shifted in favor of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and against America’s security and interests�
In addition to building a modern, blue-water navy, the PRC has taken a wide 
range of destabilizing actions that pose an increasing threat to global security� 
Among these actions are the construction of naval air stations in the South China 
Sea, including on Mischief Reef, which is located within the exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) of the Philippines, a U�S� ally; its declaration of an air-defense identi-
fication zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea near Japan; its claims of sovereignty 
over the Senkaku Islands; and its flat-out repudiation of the authority of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), the world’s oldest standing international-
law arbitral body�2 The threatening actions also include China’s unprecedented 
and increasing naval operations in the western Pacific, South Pacific, and Indian 
Oceans; the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas; the Arctic and Antarctic; and, finally, 
the Atlantic Ocean� These actions are clear empirical indicators of China’s future 
malign intentions and actions�
These intentions and actions position China’s military forces, particularly its 
navy, air force, missile forces, and rapidly expanding marine corps, as the arbiters 
of a new global order—one that stands opposed to U�S� national interests and 
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values and those of our friends and allies� China has spent billions of dollars on 
a military that can achieve the dreams of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)�
It is crucial to establish firmly and quickly why the PRC’s rapid, global, and 
very expensive naval expansion matters� The CCP is engaged in a total, pro-
tracted struggle for regional and global supremacy� This supremacy is at the 
heart of the “China Dream�”3 China’s arsenal in this campaign for supremacy 
includes economic, informational, political, and military warfare� The campaign 
at its heart is opportunistic; we have witnessed already China’s expansion into the 
vacuum of a diminishing U�S� presence in East Asia�
If one has not read Xi Jinping’s words and realized the supremacist nature of 
the China Dream and carefully watched the nature of China’s rise, then one in-
nocently might ask the obvious question: Why does it matter that the PRC seeks 
regional, or even global, hegemony? That is, why does the world not simply 
abide a “rising China,” a seemingly benign term so often employed by Beijing’s 
propaganda organs and PRC supporters worldwide? After all, fewer would be 
concerned if, for instance, a “rising Brazil” or a “rising India” sought regional 
hegemony and proclaimed a desire to lead the world into the twenty-first century�
The answer goes to the core of China’s leadership and how it behaves� Under 
the CCP, the PRC is an expansionist, coercive, hypernationalistic, militarily and 
economically powerful, brutally repressive, totalitarian state� The world has 
seen what happens when expansionist totalitarian regimes such as this are left 
unchallenged and unchecked� In a world under this type of hegemon, people are 
subjects—simply property—of the state, and ideals such as democracy, inalien-
able rights, limited government, and rule of law have no place�
Clear empirical indicators directly contradict the oft-quoted pledge by China’s 
leaders to pursue a “peaceful rise,” one in “harmony” with the rest of Asia and 
the world� By its expansionist actions and words, China has challenged the post–
World War II norms of international behavior and, most importantly, the peace 
and stability that the Indo-Pacific region has enjoyed over the past seventy years�
For instance, in spite of the country’s having a gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita on par with that of the Dominican Republic, China’s leadership has invested 
staggering amounts of national treasure in a world-leading complex of ballistic mis-
siles, satellites, and fiber-linked command centers with little utility but to pursue 
military dominance aggressively�* Despite China’s need to keep its children indoors 
because of hazardous levels of pollution, a health care system in crisis, toxic rivers, 
a demographic time bomb caused by government-directed population expansion 
and then forced contraction, and only one-third the GDP per capita of the United 
States, Beijing chooses to spend its precious resources on military force buildup�
 * For instance, the DF-21D anticarrier ballistic missile was designed by the People’s Liberation Army 
specifically to destroy U�S� aircraft carriers in the western Pacific�
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Much of that investment has gone into the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN)� The momentum created by the PLAN’s rapid advances in the maritime 
domain threatens to do for the rest of the world what the Communist Party has 
done for China Proper and its neighbors (Xinjiang and Tibet, Cambodia and 
Laos), establishing military, political, and economic domination, to varying 
degrees—as the PRC pursues what President Xi calls his China Dream�
The PLAN is China’s point of the spear in its quest for global hegemony� As 
of 2018, the PLAN consists of over 330 surface ships and sixty-six submarines—
nearly four hundred combatants� As of May 4, 2018, the U�S� Navy consisted of 
283 battle-force ships, including 211 surface ships and seventy-two submarines�4 
By 2030, it is estimated the PLAN will consist of some 550 ships: 450 surface ships 
and ninety-nine submarines�5 These numbers are a current subject of debate in 
the halls of the Capitol and the Pentagon, and it remains unclear whether the U�S� 
Navy of 2030 will reach a total of even 355 ships and submarines�
Numbers matter� In the past, it was fair to say that numbers of hulls, or even 
tonnage, were not a complete measure of force-on-force capabilities and that 
American technology would outweigh the PLAN’s numbers� Today, that argu-
ment is no longer credible� From a technological standpoint, the PRC quickly 
has achieved parity with USN standards and capacities for warship and subma-
rine production� PLAN ships and submarines do not have to match U�S� naval 
capabilities precisely; they only have to be good enough to achieve more hits and 
win any given battle� That said, the quality of PRC warships already presents a 
credible threat across the Indo-Pacific region today� Consequently, we should be 
gravely concerned about America’s ability to deter or defeat the PRC’s naval spear�
We do not have much time left—certainly not until the year 2030, when the 
PRC’s navy will be double the size of the U�S� Navy� For reasons laid out below, 
the window of vulnerability—the decade of greatest concern—begins in less than 
twenty-four months� If some currently unintended event does not provoke a mili-
tary confrontation before then, we have until 2020—the deadline that Xi Jinping 
has given the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready to invade Taiwan� From 
that point on, we can expect China to strike�
My detailed assessment of this imminent and ever-increasing maritime threat 
follows, as well as my recommendations: the actions our country must take to 
avoid geopolitical defeat and a likely naval disaster, the likes of which we have not 
experienced since the early, dark days of World War II�
A CHINESE MARITIME DREAM
In 2013, as President Xi Jinping unveiled his China Dream in a speech to the PRC 
National People’s Congress, China Central Television (CCTV) aired the week-
long series Shaping China’s Tomorrow, which explored what Chinese people think 
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about the Dream� It is noteworthy that CCTV began the series with the story of a 
PLAN East Sea Fleet–based executive officer just returned from his third escort 
mission in the Gulf of Aden� Lieutenant Commander Shi Lei related that when 
he joined the PLAN a decade prior, he never had envisioned sailing so far from 
land� But now he believes the PLAN one day will have a blue-water navy whose 
sailors can take on any mission on the open sea� Significantly, this CCTV series 
vignette symbolizes China’s shift in maritime strategy over the past decade, from 
solely a near-seas, active-defense strategy to a national maritime strategy focused 
on responsibilities and presence across the global maritime domain� Not surpris-
ingly, it aligned President Xi’s 
call for China to become “a 
strong maritime power” with 
former president Hu Jintao’s 
direction to “resolutely safe-
guard China’s maritime rights 
and interests, and build China 
into a maritime power�”6 Since 
the end of the Ninth Five-Year 
Plan in 2000, the PRC has 
embarked on an ambitious naval-construction program that dramatically has 
increased the blue-water operations of the PLAN and the China Coast Guard 
(CCG) within the first and second island chains, while substantially increasing 
far-seas deployments around much of the globe�7
The theme of China’s national rejuvenation only has strengthened during the 
first five years of President Xi’s rule� For instance, at the Nineteenth National 
Party Congress of the CCP in October 2017, Xi Jinping stated, “The theme of 
the Congress is: remain true to our original aspiration and keep our mission 
firmly in mind � � � and work tirelessly to realize the Chinese Dream of national 
rejuvenation�”8
Most importantly, realization by Xi and the CCP of the China Dream of na-
tional rejuvenation and restoration is linked to, and firmly dependent on, a global 
naval capability� The PRC has both the will and the means to push for rapid in-
creases in the PLAN’s order of battle in support of an expanding set of missions to 
fulfill the China Dream� Undergirding this thesis are China’s present and future 
naval-construction capabilities and capacity; successful, ongoing expansion of 
naval operations; and official advocacy for a modern, global, naval force—one 
that already is posing a very serious challenge for its neighbors and the U�S� Navy�
This projection of China’s maritime power relies on several assumptions� 
First, regardless of potential domestic, political, or economic difficulties, China’s 
The PLAN is China’s point of the spear in its 
quest for global hegemony. . . . China’s in-
creasingly well-publicized naval presence and 
operations throughout Southeast Asia have 
contributed to a tectonic shift in this sensitive 
region, a shift toward Beijing and authoritari-
anism and away from the United States and 
its values of democracy and the rule of law.
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leaders will continue investment “in the Navy, Coast Guard, and maritime in-
dustries to more actively and effectively assert its security and economic interests 
in the coming decades�”9 Second, China will continue to enjoy a military ship-
building cost advantage over rivals�10 And third, China will master the technical 
advances required to overcome issues arising from the production and incorpo-
ration of advanced naval systems—from phased-array radars to nuclear reactors�
While Beijing prefers to achieve its strategic aims through military intimida-
tion rather than combat, as it did at Scarborough Shoal in 2012, it is also clear that 
the PRC is prepared to use military force to achieve its strategic goals, as it already 
has done—with deadly effect—in the Paracel and Spratly Islands�11 Those goals 
are, first, to consolidate the country’s perceived territory, largely in the maritime 
domain of the first island chain—a precondition for compelling the submission 
of Taiwan—and, second, to exert its influence and power around the globe�
FORCE STRUCTURE EXPANSION AND MILITARY MODERNIZATION
Over the course of nearly two decades, the PLA has benefited from the CCP’s 
military modernization effort, the largest by any nation since the end of World 
War II� This transformation has not been limited to the procurement of combat 
platforms such as ships, submarines, aircraft, tanks, and rockets, but also has en-
compassed areas ranging from combat-support services to command and control 
and civil-military integration�
Throughout these years, the PLA has been charged with the overarching goal 
of “realizing the Chinese Dream and the dream of building a powerful military�”12 
President Xi has made clear that the CCP has “developed a strategy for the 
military under new circumstances, and ha[s] made every effort to modernize 
national defense and the armed forces�”13
Military and Command Reorganization
Since taking office, President Xi has restructured the PLA in China’s seven mili-
tary regions into five theater commands� He also reorganized the Central Military 
Commission (CMC) by establishing and subordinating the army’s service head-
quarters; raising the stature and role of the strategic missile, air, and naval forces; 
and establishing a Strategic Support Force (SSF) to integrate space-, cyber-, 
and electronic-warfare capabilities�14
Furthermore, by early 2016, President Xi had reorganized and streamlined 
the senior echelons of the PLA by discarding “the PLA’s four traditional gen-
eral departments in favor of 15 new CMC functional departments�”15 To put a 
capstone on this transformation, Xi announced that the CMC would now be in 
charge of the “overall administration of the PLA, People’s Armed Police, militia, 
and reserves,” with the new theater commands (sometimes referred to as joint 
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war zones) focusing on combat preparedness� Meanwhile, the various services 
would be responsible for the development of programs to man, train, and equip 
the force (in the United States, in relation to the National Guard, these are called 
the Title 10 authorities)�16
Also of significant concern, Xi has placed authority over the CCG under the 
CMC� Thus, the CCG, Asia’s largest coast guard, is no longer under the civilian 
command of the State Oceanic Administration� It now falls under Xi’s direct 
command, through his control of the People’s Armed Police�17
A closer examination of each of the PLA forces is necessary to understand and 
appreciate their rapidly expanding capabilities�
The People’s Liberation Army Navy
Since 2000, the PRC has embarked on an ambitious naval-construction program 
that dramatically increased the PLAN’s and the CCG’s blue-water operations 
within the first and second island chains, while substantially increasing far-seas 
deployments around much of the globe�18
With the realization of the China Dream firmly linked to a global naval capa-
bility, China’s leaders are on the cusp of achieving their military and economic 
goals� They are increasing the PLAN’s order of battle rapidly in support of an 
expanding set of global missions to fulfill their China Dream of national restora-
tion and rejuvenation, which will in turn fuel and secure their global economic 
expansion through the $1�6 trillion Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)� Previously 
called the One Belt One Road, and before that the Maritime Silk Road, the scope 
of the initiative spans eighty countries�19
While official Chinese documents describe the BRI as purely commercial and 
a win-win for participants, studies have shown that internal PRC discussion of 
the BRI characterizes it as a stealthy conduit of political influence and not only 
maritime but also naval expansion�20 Between 2000 and 2014, China committed 
$126 billion to the transport and storage sectors�21 These commitments led to 
port deals worldwide that provide extensive expansion opportunities� China’s 
goals of present and future naval-construction capabilities and capacity; success-
ful, ongoing expansion of naval operations; and official advocacy for a modern, 
global, naval force already are posing a challenge for the country’s neighbors and 
the U�S� Navy�22
The PLAN’s expansion from 2000 to 2018 far exceeds the buildup in any other 
nation’s navy in the post–World War II era, save for the U�S� Navy under President 
Ronald W� Reagan during the 1980s� For China’s leaders to achieve their vision 
of a rejuvenated and restored China, they need a fleet that can expand China’s 
interior lines out into the maritime domain�23 In other words, they need naval, 
air, missile, and expeditionary forces that can take China’s regional military 
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dominance and intimidation to the global realm� Because of atrophy of U�S� naval 
forces over the last decade, Beijing’s goal is expected to be realized by 2020�
Concurrent with the PLAN modernization has been the changing pattern of 
its operations� Instead of continuing its role as a coastal naval force operating 
within fifty nautical miles (nm) of China’s coast, today the PLAN has pushed out 
into the blue water of the Pacific Ocean and beyond (figures 1 and 2)� An exami-
nation of PLAN blue-water operations during the past fifteen years reveals that 
“China’s ambitious naval modernization has produced a more technologically 
advanced and flexible force�” This evolving naval force will provide Beijing with 
the capability to conduct a military campaign successfully within the first island 
chain (for instance, to take Taiwan or the Senkaku Islands)�24 
This transformation has required a new force structure, one that has increased 
both the number and the type of naval platforms� With respect to far-seas op-
erations, the U�S� Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) reported that the PLAN’s 
“diversified missions and far seas operations” during the previous decade had 
stimulated an operational shift and catalyzed the acquisition of new multimission 
platforms�25 These multimission platforms are perfectly suited for naval combat 
against naval forces tasked to defend Japan’s southwest islands and Taiwan, and 
U�S� naval forces globally as well�26 The PLAN’s ability to confront and deny ac-
cess to U�S� naval forces regionally is now widely recognized, but its ability to 
confront—and defeat—U�S� naval forces globally merits more attention than it 
has received�
Figure 1: PLA Military Capabilities 2000 Figure 2: Expanding Military Capabilities 
2015 
Sources: Order of battle based on author’s compilation of open-source data. Build rate derived 
from Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities–
Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2014), pp. 27–29. 
Sources: Order of battle based on author’s compilation of open-source data. Build rate derived from Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implica-
tions for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), pp. 27–29.
FIGURE 1
PLA MILITARY CAPABILITIES 2000
FIGURE 2
EXPANDING MILITARY CAPABILITIES 2015
= 25 advanced fighter/ 
strike aircraft
 = 3 submarines
 = 5 surface ships
 = 25 ballistic missiles
= 25 advanced fighter/ 
strike aircraft
 = 3 submarines
 = 5 surface ships
 = 25 ballistic missiles
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In their article “Taking Stock of China’s Growing Navy: The Death and Life 
of Surface Fleets,” James R� Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara correctly assert that 
the PLAN is “particularly well-suited to seize islands�”27 They hypothesize that 
PLAN assault forces will be led by surface combatant strike groups composed of 
the service’s premier combatant, the Type 052D Luyang III–class guided-missile 
destroyers, along with the Type 054C Luyang II–class guided-missile destroyers, 
the Type 054A Jiangkai III–class guided-missile frigates, and the Soviet-built 
Sovremenny-class destroyers�
With their superior arsenal of antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), these surface 
action strike groups can provide withering naval gunfire support for an am-
phibious landing force� They have great range, speed, and survivability� These 
combatants also would provide a sea-based air defense that would constrain or 
even preclude U�S� or allied air operations near an amphibious operation�28 Given 
China’s superior number of advanced surface combatants, “it is far from clear 
that the United States retains its accustomed supremacy,” especially in a Taiwan 
invasion or Senkaku Islands campaign in which naval warfare will determine 
mission success�29
Regarding the Senkakus, PLAN forces have increased their operations in and 
around the islands since 2012, in addition to activity by China’s Maritime Law 
Enforcement, the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) ships, and 
the largest civilian fishing fleets on the planet� Prior to 2012, PLAN warships 
generally patrolled on the west side of the median line between China and Japan; 
since 2012, Chinese warships have been operating for sustained periods east of 
the median line� This trend culminated on June 19, 2016, when the Japanese 
destroyer Setogiri confirmed that a PLAN Jiangkai I–class frigate had entered the 
contiguous zone of the Senkaku island of Kuba�30 
Following this pattern, the PRC also has been tightening the noose around 
Taiwan over the last two years� In April 2018, the PLA engaged in its largest-ever 
attack exercises in the Taiwan Strait, and in the first live-fire exercises there since 
2015� In addition, People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) nuclear-capable 
aircraft circled the island repeatedly during the month in efforts to intimidate 
the Taiwan government and populace� Other PLAAF aircraft circling Taiwan in-
cluded multiple fighter jets, H-6K bombers, and early-warning airplanes�31 PLA 
forces involved in the assault exercises reportedly included some ten thousand 
personnel, seventy-six fighter jets, forty-eight naval vessels, a nuclear-powered 
submarine, and the PLAN’s aircraft carrier Liaoning (CV 16), which conducted 
its first carrier strike group operations in the waters of the Philippine Sea just 
east of Taiwan�32
The challenge for the defending force of allied and U�S� warships operat-
ing within the first island chain is compounded by China’s ability to bring the 
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firepower of all three of its fleets into the sea area around these islands� In addi-
tion, China’s naval firepower will come from a densely populated submarine force 
armed with supersonic, sea-skimming, 290 nm–range YJ-18 ASCMs, as well as 
air-delivered ASCMs from the PLAAF�
With these surface, subsurface, and air forces on hand in the East China Sea, 
the PLAN has the capability to conduct a short, sharp war to fulfill its pledge of 
taking Japan’s Senkaku Islands� The United States and its allies have insufficient 
capabilities in the region and easily could lose a conventional war in the Senkakus 
if China strikes first� Taiwan would pose greater challenges for the PRC, but the 
PRC now has a significant capability to launch a devastating no-warning attack 
on the island democracy�
Further, while the PLAN’s forays by flotillas into European and African waters 
have drawn public attention, of greater concern is the PRC’s increasing ability to 
sustain those forces from a widening web of PRC-controlled naval logistic bases 
from Southeast Asia to the Mediterranean� These ports have been developed for 
military purposes, and many will control strategic choke points such as the Strait 
of Malacca and the Suez Canal� Most of China’s port deals are for a period of 
ninety-nine years or more�33
The commander of U�S� Pacific Forces warned Congress in early 2017 that 
China’s naval “presence and influence are expanding,” thanks in large part to the 
commercial network created by the BRI� The PRC is using state-owned compa-
nies and politically linked private firms to create a network of facilities designed 
to provide logistic support to deployed PLAN warships, employing a “first civil-
ian, later military” approach to port development across the region� Chinese 
warships already are taking advantage of the dual-use possibilities of commercial 
ports, bolstered by laws that oblige Chinese transportation firms working over-
seas to provide replenishment for navy vessels�34
PLAN Amphibious Forces
Perhaps the most important aspect of any successful Chinese maritime sover-
eignty campaign involves the act of physically occupying islands within the first 
and second island chains� The key to holding these contested islands is the ability 
to move forces ashore successfully to seize and hold the ground�
China continues to build and train its naval and amphibious forces in the 
art of expeditionary warfare, a skill set easily applied to regional island-seizure 
or global force-projection campaigns� In addition to the Taiwan Strait live-fire 
exercises alluded to previously, Chinese marines recently conducted amphibious 
assault exercises in the South China Sea using amphibious dock landing ships, 
air-cushion landing craft, and shipborne helicopters�35 This type of training is 
ubiquitous across the East and South China Seas and is the most tangible evi-
dence of the PLA’s preparation to conduct such a mission�
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One facet of President Xi’s transformation of the PLA includes a dramatic 
expansion of the People’s Liberation Army Marine Corps (PLAMC) to one hun-
dred thousand personnel—an enormous increase for a nation ostensibly devoted 
to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and, in reality, threatened by no 
other nation. According to reports in the South China Morning Post, “two spe-
cial warfare brigades ha[ve] already been incorporated into the PLAMC, raising 
the forces’ complement of soldiers to 20,000.”36 These new PLAMC forces will 
be dispatched to far-flung installations such as Gwadar, Pakistan, and the new 
PLAN base in Djibouti. In these locations, they effectively will threaten America’s 
African and South Asian allies and buttress China’s allies operating in these re-
gions, including Russia, Pakistan, and Iran. They also threaten Taiwan and the 
Senkakus with potential invasion, as well as islands and countries in East Asia 
and Southeast Asia more generally. Growth in PLAMC personnel is necessary to 
tip the balance of power in these regions from favoring the United States and its 
allies to favoring China’s growing maritime and territorial ambitions.
To provide the amphibious lift needed for this vastly expanded marine corps, 
China is producing an increasing number of large, high-end, amphibious war-
ships and is intent on building many more over the near term. According to the 
ONI, as of 2015 the PLAN has fifty-six amphibious warships, ranging from a few 
World War II–era landing ships to four of the large, modern Yuzhao-class Type 
071 amphibious transport dock ships that provide a substantially greater capacity 
and more formidable capability than older landing ships.37 The Yuzhao-class ship 
is designed for a wide range of island campaigns, including against Taiwan or the 
Senkakus or in the South China Sea, and force projection into the Indian Ocean 
and globally. It can hold up to four of the new air-cushion landing craft as well as 
four or more helicopters, along with armored vehicles and troops.38
Not content with the Yuzhao, China has announced it “has started building a 
new generation of large amphibious assault vessels that will strengthen the navy 
as it plays a more dominant role in projecting the nation’s power overseas.”39 The 
PLAN commander, Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong, reportedly visited the Hudong-
Zhonghua Shipbuilding Company in Shanghai in March 2017, where the new 
ship, identified as the Type 075 landing helicopter dock, is under construction.40
The Type 075 is much larger than any other amphibious warship previously 
built for the PLAN and is suited specifically to an opposed island-seizure cam-
paign and global force projection. It can carry a much larger number of attack 
and transport helicopters (as many as thirty) and has the ability to launch six 
helicopters simultaneously.41 For a PRC amphibious assault force, this greatly 
enhanced heliborne assault capability is critically important. For example, in a re-
gional Senkaku Islands seizure campaign, the closest PLA airfield to the Senkaku 
Islands from which the PLA could launch attacking helicopters is more than 180 
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nm away� The Type 075 will provide the critical element for the PLA to be able 
to project boots on the ground to targeted islands throughout the western Pacific 
and pose a credible threat to military targets globally�
At the current rate of amphibious assault ship production, the PLAN and the 
PLAMC will be well resourced and ready to take islands within the first island 
chain—or objectives as far away from the PRC’s shores as needed—by the early 
2020s�
While a detailed PRC shipbuilding plan for the next fifteen years has not been 
made public, analysis of available evidence permits extrapolation of the numbers 
of ships and submarines China will need by 2030 to achieve its national maritime 
goals� The following priorities are my assessment of what is most important for 
China’s future naval trajectory and its justification for a 550-ship/submarine fleet: 
(1) near-seas active-defense operations, (2) far-seas operations, (3) “goodwill” de-
ployments, (4) surge operations, (5) the BRI, (6) carrier strike group operations, 
(7) amphibious assault group operations, and (8) submarine-launched ballistic-
missile patrols�42
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force
On November 23, 2013, the PRC abruptly declared an ADIZ in the East China 
Sea�43 While Beijing portrayed the ADIZ as being about protecting China’s main-
land, the zone represents the importance the regime places on the air domain in 
any attempt to take Taiwan or the Senkaku or Spratly Islands�
Since the East China Sea ADIZ declaration, the PLAAF has increased the 
scope and scale of flights in and around the Senkaku Islands� In December 2012, 
a Chinese maritime surveillance aircraft entered the Senkaku Islands’ territorial 
airspace for the first time in fifty years�44 This event, which went unopposed 
except for public statements, ushered in an era of expanded PLAAF activities in 
the East China Sea, where fighter, airborne warning and control, and signal- and 
electronic-intelligence aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles have expanded 
their air operations farther southeast toward the Senkaku Islands�45
As a result of this strategy shift, Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) fight-
ers increased their reactions to Chinese aircraft probing Japan’s ADIZ, from ap-
proximately three hundred events in 2012 to nearly seven hundred in 2016�46 And 
while JASDF reactions to the PLAAF were fewer in 2017, owing in large part to 
the CCP’s Nineteenth National Party Congress, the overall increase in PLAAF air 
activity directed toward Japan’s airspace caused the JASDF to double the number 
of its interceptors from two to four fighter aircraft, a clear indication of Japan’s 
concern about the strategic trend line of the PLAAF�47
In addition, the PLAAF has completed an aggressive transition from being an 
exclusively territorial air-defense force to one that routinely operates over the vast 
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distances of the high seas within the first and second island chains� For instance, 
in 2013, the PLAAF began flights into the western Pacific Ocean via the Miyako 
Strait and since then has averaged between five and six events per year, with 
multiple aircraft�48 The aircraft types conducting flights have included bomber, 
fighter, refueling, electronic-intelligence, and airborne early warning aircraft—
attesting to the comprehensive nature of how China would employ airpower to 
help secure and maintain its control over the Senkaku Islands�
Adding complexity to the air domain, the PLAAF conducted “its first-ever 
exercise over the western Pacific via the Bashi Channel” in late March 2015�49 
Despite PLAAF public assertions that these drills were routine and not targeted 
against “any particular country, regions or targets,” there is little doubt that PLA 
air forces, including the PLAAF and the People’s Liberation Army Naval Air 
Force (the PLAN’s naval aviation branch, the PLANAF), entering the Philippine 
Sea via the Bashi Channel or the Miyako Strait provide the PLA with considerable 
operational and tactical flexibility in any island-seizure attack campaign within 
the first island chain�50
The PLAAF announced in mid-September 2016 that it would conduct regu-
lar exercises flying past the first island chain�51 True to its word, the PLAAF has 
conducted flights through the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel, such as on 
March 3, 2017, when China sent thirteen aircraft through the Miyako Strait�52 
According to the Japanese Ministry of Defense, this was “the largest number of 
foreign planes Japan has scrambled jets for since such data first became available 
in 2003�”53
The PLAAF also now routinely sends bombers to threaten Japan, Guam, and 
other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) allies� In March 2018, 
the PLAAF sent six H-6K bombers; one Tu-154; and one Y-8 intelligence, sur-
veillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft through the Miyako Strait into the 
western Pacific to exercise what the PLAAF stated was “long-range operational 
capabilities�” In reality, these were attack training profiles for strikes on Guam, 
while sending Su-35 fighters on their first combat patrol over the South China 
Sea�54 And most recently, on May 11, 2018, the PLA’s Eastern and Southern 
Commands dispatched two groups of H-6K bombers, accompanied by KJ-2000 
airborne early warning aircraft and Su-35 and J-11 fighters, in clockwise and 
counterclockwise patterns from the Chinese mainland through the Miyako Strait 
and the Bashi Channel, demonstrating the PLAAF’s ability to operate under 
“high-sea conditions” against Taiwan�55
The increasing proximity of Chinese aircraft to the Senkaku Islands is of par-
ticular significance� According to Japan’s Ministry of Defense, China has increased 
the number of PLAAF aircraft that fly south of 27 degrees north latitude, an un-
spoken demarcation line that Japan considers to be a defensive borderline�56 JASDF 
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tactical objectives are designed to keep Chinese planes from flying within a mini-
mum protective air umbrella of approximately 60 nm from the Senkaku Islands�
The combined failure of Japan and the United States to defend this line sends 
China the message that our resolve to defend the Senkakus themselves may be 
weak� The same can be said for our ability to defend the airspace around Taiwan 
and, worse still, in the South China Sea�
China easily could begin a campaign to take Japanese islands, Taiwan, or 
the islands of the South China Sea by exploiting and surprising local air com-
manders� Specifically, the PLAAF could launch a large number of fighters and 
other aircraft toward Okinawa via the Miyako Strait and up through the Bashi 
Channel, with the goal of diverting, diffusing, and degrading U�S� and allied 
defensive efforts to establish airspace control� On these islands, an assault by 
the main invasion force, either airborne from helicopters or seaborne, would be 
conducted concurrently� And both this combined-arms diversion and the main 
assault would take place under the cover of one of the most sophisticated missile 
and rocket forces on the planet�
Finally, if there was any doubt about the PRC’s intention to develop the capa-
bility for global power projection, specifically nuclear power, one need look no 
further than PLAAF commander Ma Xiaotian’s December 2016 assertion that 
“China is developing next-generation long-range bombers,” expected to be desig-
nated the H-20 bomber� This new bomber, according to Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo, 
director of the PLAN’s Expert Consultation Committee, would be on par with the 
U�S� Air Force B-2 stealth bomber�57 This was reinforced again in May 2018 when 
the Xi’an Aircraft Industrial Corporation revealed a mysterious, new-model jet, 
rumored to be the PRC’s new stealth bomber�58
People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces
In terms of kinetic fires, and per the Chinese military doctrine of joint-fire strike 
campaign, Beijing likely would use its extensive ballistic- and cruise-missile 
arsenal, from the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces (PLARF), PLAAF, 
PLANAF, and PLAN, to disrupt U�S� rear-area operations in Japan and through-
out the area of operations� Specifically, in a Senkakus or Taiwan attack scenario, 
Japan and the United States should expect attacks against military bases on the 
main Japanese island of Honshu, the Ryukyus, and Guam, where the majority 
of Japanese and U�S� military strength resides� In his article “Has China Been 
Practicing Preemptive Missile Strikes against U�S� Bases?,” Commander Thomas 
Shugart, USN, convincingly argues that “the greatest military threat to U�S� vital 
interests in Asia may be one that has received somewhat less attention: the grow-
ing capability of China’s missile forces to strike U�S� bases�”59
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The purpose of these supporting fires, as articulated in joint-fire strike cam-
paign doctrine, would be to coordinate and synchronize antiship ballistic and 
cruise missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, air strikes with precision-guided 
munitions, and counter-C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) strikes with specialized weapons. 
These fires would facilitate the main objective of seizing Taiwan or the Senkaku 
Islands and isolating Japanese, Taiwan, and U.S. military forces arrayed across 
the region.
However, Beijing’s strategic designs extend well beyond the first island chain. 
For instance, in April 2018, the PLARF announced the establishment of a new 
DF-26 brigade and its deployment to an undetected site. The DF-26, with a range 
of nearly 2,200 nm, is the PRC’s second anticarrier ballistic missile. The first, 
the DF-21D, with a range of nearly 1,000 nm, when deployed to Hainan Island, 
places the entirety of the South China Sea within weapons range. Ultimately, both 
of these “carrier killer” missiles demonstrate the PRC’s commitment to power 
projection against the U.S. Navy. Interestingly, the PLARF also noted that “it has 
been sparing no effort to foster the capability to conduct nuclear retaliation and 
intermediate- and long-range precision strikes and has obtained a succession of 
breakthroughs in new weapons’ research and development.”60
Given the recent deployment of the YJ-12B surface-to-surface and HQ-9 
surface-to-air missiles to the PRC’s artificial island bases in the Spratlys, it is en-
tirely conceivable that the PRC’s rocket forces could be used in a similar fashion 
to deploy ballistic-missile systems to China’s emerging overseas military bases in 
Djibouti and Pakistan and elsewhere along the course of the BRI.61
PLA Informatization Department and Strategic Support Force
PLA strategy addresses informatization in both its offensive combat and counter-
intervention operations. Informatization—“the ability to transmit, process, and 
receive information”—is a vital enabler and is at the core of everything the PLA 
wants to accomplish. These missions include blue-water naval confrontations, 
amphibious assaults to take islands, high-tech missions in space and cyber-
space, long-range precision kinetic and nonkinetic strikes, and naval war-at-sea 
operations.62
Reforms to the PLA informatization department began in 2015 and are ex-
pected to be complete by 2020, when lines of responsibility between it and the 
SSF are further delineated. The SSF’s mission reportedly is focused on “strategic- 
level information support” for “space, cyber, electronic, and psychological 
warfare.”63 One of its main missions will be strategic denial of the electromagnetic 
spectrum.64
The SSF is a critical factor for joint operations through this mission of strategic- 
level information support. The SSF also has assumed responsibilities for strategic 
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information warfare� China’s cyber forces would play a critical role in any coun-
terintervention strategy against the United States, Taiwan, and Japan in any 
island-seizure conflict� These same cyber forces will support PLAN operations 
against U�S� forces and those of supporting friends and allies globally in other 
scenarios� The two organizations responsible for this, the Third Department of 
the PLA General Staff Headquarters (3PLA) and the Fourth Department (4PLA), 
are both subordinated to the SSF�65
China has invested heavily in countersatellite electronic-warfare capabilities 
to force a “no satellite, no fight” environment on the United States� The SSF has 
consolidated the management and control over space-based ISR assets� Equally 
troubling, it also may have nonkinetic antisatellite capabilities, such as directed-
energy weapons�
SSF and the Fight for Public Opinion. In any conflict within the Indo-Pacific 
region or globally, the PRC’s fight for public opinion will constitute the second 
battlefield, on which it will wage a wide range of political warfare (PW) opera-
tions� Accordingly, the overall PW effort, and the SSF’s support for it, requires 
special attention�
Guided by the doctrinal principle of “uniting with friends and disintegrating 
enemies,” the PRC continuously employs active PW measures to promote its rise 
and to combat perceived threats� Its PW operations employ strategic psychologi-
cal operations (psyops) to propagate the CCP’s narrative of events, actions, and 
policies to lead international discourse and influence policies of friends and foes 
alike� These PW operations at first may appear to be benign soft-power activities, 
but under scrutiny they often include coercive persuasion campaigns intended to 
manipulate international perceptions�66
Chinese strategic literature particularly emphasizes the role of psyops, legal 
warfare, and public opinion warfare—collectively known as the three warfares—
to subdue an enemy ahead of conflict or ensure victory if conflict breaks out� 
According to available literature and experience, it is certain that the PRC will 
engage in “hybrid warfare” similar to, but likely more sophisticated than, that 
employed in Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea� The PRC will augment conven-
tional military operations with nonconventional operations, such as subversion, 
disinformation and misinformation (now commonly referred to as “fake news”), 
and cyber attacks� The operationalization of psyops with cyber warfare is key to 
this strategy�67 China has empowered its psychological warfare forces fully, most 
notably at the three warfares base (or 311 base) in Fuzhou� These forces are sub-
ordinate to the SSF and integrated with China’s cyber forces�
While the CCP’s effective use of PW operations goes back to the beginning of 
the party, its operations—particularly its efforts to build what amounts to fifth 
columns overseas, through the CCP’s United Front Work Department—took on 
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new impetus with Xi Jinping’s ascension to the leadership of party and govern-
ment in 2012 and 2013, respectively� The United Front is the CCP organization 
that forges domestic and international political coalitions for influence opera-
tions worldwide� In Xi’s view, the time had come for a strong and confident China 
to move beyond former Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s advice to 
hide its assets and bide its time� Delegates to the party Central Committee’s Eigh-
teenth National Congress were lectured on the importance of United Front work, 
and the bureaucracy hastened to comply�68
Prior to initiating an offensive or other military confrontation, China will use 
worldwide psyops and public opinion warfare as part of a concerted PW cam-
paign� It will employ Chinese United Front organizations and other sympathiz-
ers, along with both Chinese and other nations’ mass-information channels such 
as the Internet, television, and radio�
The focus of these influence operations will be to support China’s position and 
demonize, confuse, and demoralize the United States and its supporting friends 
and allies� Internally, this campaign will be important in mobilizing mass support 
for the righteous action, while externally the campaign will attempt to gain sup-
port for China’s position from those nations undecided about which side (if any) 
to support� In addition to standard propaganda, disinformation will be employed, 
such as false reports of surrender of national governments or forces, fabricated 
atrocities and other violations of international law, and other untrue reports in-
tended to undermine decision-making by the United States and its friends and 
allies� Also, United Front organizations, working or in parallel with the PAFMM, 
China’s merchant marine, and its massive fishing fleets, may instigate incidents 
and other actions that disrupt USN and friendly-force maritime operations�
This PW campaign will continue through the military confrontation and 
after—regardless of the success or failure of the operation�
SSF Impact. In a further move that leaves no doubt about the role the CCP envi-
sions for its United Front in the battle for public opinion, on February 17, 2017, 
Xi issued a directive to cultivate greater support among the members of the es-
timated sixty-million-strong Chinese diaspora worldwide� He called for “closely 
uniting” with overseas Chinese in support of the Chinese Dream, as part of the 
greater efforts and activities of the United Front� Xi stressed that “to realize the 
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, we must work together with our sons 
and daughters at home and abroad� � � � It is an important task for the party and 
the state to unite the vast number of overseas Chinese and returned overseas 
Chinese and their families in the country and play their positive role in the great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation�”69
Xi and the CCP will exploit these overseas Chinese citizens to weaken military 
and political adversaries worldwide and advance the CCP’s political and military 
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objectives�70 Prime among these efforts will be lobbying for the establishment of 
more PRC military bases�
Ultimately, the purpose of these SSF suborganizations is to ensure the sanc-
tity of national- and theater-level command and control as well as to enhance 
the war-fighting effectiveness of each of the individual services� Whether in a 
preferred short, sharp regional war to seize islands or in another confrontation 
that may take place globally, these invisible forces will provide precise situational 
awareness, target identification of opposing forces, network-defense capabilities, 
and real-time command and control that will enable the PLA to take and hold 
military objectives� They also will work to subvert, discourage, and confuse the 
national leadership and operational forces of the United States and its supporting 
friends and allies�
As an example of these efforts, in 2014 the PLA established a permanent joint 
operations command (JOC) center responsible for integrating the operations of 
its army, navy, and air forces� It was the first time such a JOC had been estab-
lished, and the center was seen as boosting “the unified operations of Chinese 
capabilities on land, sea, air, and in dealing with strategic missile operations�”71 
When these actions are combined with President Xi’s other PLA reforms, it seems 
clear that China’s ability to command and control all its forces and disrupt oppos-
ing forces in a military confrontation is well established and practiced�
THE PRC’S GLOBAL STRATEGY AND PRESENCE
China’s expanding naval force structure has allowed it to project power on an 
increasingly global scale� On its path to global maritime hegemony, the PLAN 
began as a marginally capable, coast-hugging, brown-water force� After Ameri-
can forces departed most of Southeast Asia in the 1970s, China tentatively pushed 
out into the blue waters of the South China Sea� By the 1980s, China’s naval forces 
began conducting small-scale, routine operations in both the South and East 
China Seas� This situation remained static and mostly benign through the 1990s, 
but by 2000 the PRC’s strategic goals became clear�
Over the past decade, we have seen the PLAN routinely operate and deploy 
warships as far away as the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, Baltic, and 
Arctic Seas� In fact, by 2015 China was making moves to acquire berthing in the 
Azores—about a third of the way to the U�S� East Coast from Portugal—as well 
as operating hydrographic research ships in the South Atlantic—a harbinger of 
future PLAN submarine operations in the North Atlantic�
In a reversal of old geopolitical truisms, China’s trade is leading the flag, as 
well as vice versa� China has sealed long-term port deals that span the globe, 
including in Australia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Myanmar, the 
Strait of Malacca, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Djibouti, Tanzania, Mauritius, 
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Namibia, and Greece� In addition, China currently is negotiating port deals in the 
Maldives, Scandinavia, and Greenland�
These ports already have started to provide critical berthing and logistics sup-
port to China’s merchant marine and the PLAN, including refueling, provisions, 
and maintenance� China’s merchant marine ships, meanwhile, are not regular 
commercial-transport ships� Since 2015, they have been required by Chinese law 
to be built to military specifications� The year prior, China coordinated many of 
its merchant marine ships to push back forcibly against Vietnamese vessels pro-
testing Chinese oil exploration in Vietnam’s EEZ�72
Vital strategic arteries are a focus of PRC control and acquisition planning� 
Chinese business interests have heavy influence over the Panama Canal, as evi-
denced by a milestone treaty signed by Panama and China in 2017� The treaty, 
which came into force in May 2018, is designed to promote maritime and port 
development by the PRC in Panama�73 Further, the PLAN has berthing agree-
ments in Malaysia near the Strait of Malacca, it operates a military base in Dji-
bouti, which is at a choke point for the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, and the com-
mander of the U�S� Southern Command recently testified before Congress that 
it is “worth paying attention to” the prospect of the PRC building a naval facility 
in the Western Hemisphere�74 At the current rate, this Western Hemisphere PRC 
naval facility is not a matter of if, but when�
Of equal concern, influential PRC and Thai political leaders are conducting 
advanced planning for a PRC-built canal across the Kra Isthmus of Thailand 
that simultaneously would diminish Singapore’s economic and political viability 
while cutting travel time by three days compared with transit through the Ma-
lacca Strait� Since the Malacca Strait currently handles approximately 40 percent 
of global trade flows, this would increase PRC commercial power vastly�75 It also 
would fund, justify, and facilitate PLAN naval operations between the Indian 
Ocean and the Gulf of Siam� A similar canal has been proposed for Nicaragua�76
Since 2008, China has conducted nonstop antipiracy operations in the Gulf of 
Aden� These operations have been a boon for the PLAN’s development as a blue-
water naval fighting force and also have provided a portal for Chinese influence 
into the Middle East balance of power� For instance, since 2013 the PLAN has 
conducted regular deployments of nuclear submarines into the Indian Ocean, 
and while submarines, especially nuclear-powered types, are suboptimal against 
pirates, they are a highly useful threat against India� The threatening of an emerg-
ing U�S� friend and Quad member, India, reveals the actual strategic purpose of 
China’s submarine and naval operations in the Indian Ocean region�77 In August 
2017, China deployed at least fourteen naval ships in the Indian Ocean�78
The PLAN also has conducted oceanographic research operations in the Indi-
an Ocean, East and South China Seas, and Atlantic Ocean, as well as commercial 
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oceanographic expeditions in the Mariana Trench (within Guam’s EEZ), other 
parts of Micronesia, Benham Rise (within the Philippine EEZ), and the western 
Pacific� China’s naval oceanography often is conducted in tandem with, or under 
the guise of, scientific or commercial oceanography, but its real intent is to gain 
important data about the undersea domain, principally anything of benefit to the 
PLAN elite submarine force�
In 2017, Chinese hydrographic survey vessels were caught mapping the ocean 
floor in the Philippines’ territorial waters of the Luzon and Surigao Straits and in 
the Caroline Islands of Micronesia� This ocean floor mapping assists the PLAN 
subsurface fleet in preparing to break out of the first and second island chains 
and into the western Pacific and Atlantic; doing so would leave global shipping, 
the continental United States, and all other territories vulnerable to submarine-
launched cruise missile and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) attacks 
during wartime�79
In furtherance of these goals, the PLAN has developed a network of sensors 
that incorporates ships, submarines, buoys, satellites, and unmanned underwater 
gliders� The service’s hunger to acquire this information knows no bounds, as was 
demonstrated when a PLAN warship captured a U�S� underwater glider in 2016, 
in a brazenly open theft of U�S� military technology�80 The PLAN’s development 
of underwater listening arrays and passive sonar will erode, if not outrun, the 
current U�S� advantage over the next five to ten years if more U�S� funding is not 
made available in this high-priority, strategic area of naval warfare�
Russia-PRC JOINT SEA Exercises
The PLAN also has been conducting joint naval-warfare exercises, named 
JOINT SEA by the PRC, with the Russian navy since 2012, when the first exer-
cise occurred in the waters of the Yellow Sea� Since then the scope, scale, and 
complexity of the exercises in this series have expanded� Each year the PLAN 
has dispatched its warships to the Sea of Japan and the Mediterranean and Baltic 
Seas�
In the latest iteration, JOINT SEA 2017, three Chinese and ten Russian war-
ships conducted naval-warfare training for several weeks in the Baltic� This was 
the first time the PLAN had operated in the Baltic Sea, and by all accounts its 
performance in this joint operation was flawless� This sent a chilling hard-power 
diplomatic message to Eastern Europe, as China has never denounced Russia’s 
2014 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, and Estonia frequently complains of 
Russian naval and air forces operating too closely to its shores� However, in a 
disturbing turn of events, European capitals apparently accepted the Chinese 
naval presence as the price to be paid for benefiting from Beijing’s BRI�81
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Tectonic Shifts in Southeast Asia
China’s naval advance in Southeast Asia has been swift in historical terms, but in-
cremental when viewed in the context of America’s blinkered four-year political 
cycle� It unfortunately has been met with almost no resistance and, most notably, 
by a failure of U�S� resolve to recognize and confront the dangers while the U�S� 
Navy still held the preponderance of power� China’s increasingly well-publicized 
naval presence and operations throughout Southeast Asia have contributed to a 
tectonic shift in this sensitive region, a shift toward Beijing and authoritarianism 
and away from the United States and its values of democracy and the rule of law� 
Key milestones in the PRC’s maritime and political expansion into Southeast Asia 
are outlined below�
In 1974, the PLA attacked and captured Duncan Island in the Paracels, killing 
dozens of South Vietnamese soldiers� The United States did nothing to assist its 
ally against China, despite having a carrier nearby�82 China subsequently occu-
pied all the Paracels, where it now has twenty naval outposts�83
In 1988, China captured Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands from lightly armed 
Vietnamese troops who were standing knee-deep on the shoal in an attempt to 
establish a presence� The PLAN murdered all sixty-four soldiers by opening fire 
from naval ships with large-caliber deck guns� The Philippines made a diplomatic 
protest of this occupation in its claimed EEZ, but the United States took no mili-
tary action, sending a message of U�S� ambiguity to China and our allies�84
In 1995, China occupied Mischief Reef, an unoccupied low-tide elevation 
within the EEZ of the Philippines� Again, the United States did nothing� China 
now has dredged and added naval outposts to all the Spratly islands that it 
controls�85
In 2012, the presence of PRC commercial ships at Scarborough Shoal, also 
within the Philippines’ EEZ, instigated a standoff that ultimately intimidated the 
Philippine coast guard and fishermen away from their ancestral fishing grounds� 
The U�S� State Department arguably abetted the PRC’s occupation when Kurt 
Campbell, then the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
negotiated a mutual withdrawal of PLAN and Philippine naval assets from Scar-
borough� The plan was flawed; the PRC immediately reneged, refusing to remove 
its vessels from the shoal and thereby establishing itself as the sole naval power 
at the shoal� This single event has had the negative consequence of providing 
President Duterte of the Philippines with a justification for siding with the PRC 
after he came to office� More importantly, this failure to support a treaty ally has 
damaged U�S� credibility severely, not only with the Philippines, but across the 
entire Indo-Pacific region�
China’s claim of the so-called nine-dash line as its sovereign boundary and 
its occupations of the Philippines’ EEZ were ruled illegal in 2016 by the PCA 
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in The Hague.86 But the United States took no action to recover lost Philippine 
rights, and its ally the Philippines already had given up on the possibility of U.S. 
protection.87
The PCA ruling was too little, too late. China now has announced plans to 
dredge Scarborough Shoal, just 120 nm from the U.S. Navy’s former deepwater 
base at Subic Bay. China’s YJ-12 and YJ-18 ASCMs both have an approximately 
290 nm range, suggesting that it would be foolhardy to conduct naval operations 
from Subic in the future without first establishing control of Scarborough.
Most significantly, China now has deployed YJ-12B ASCMs to Mischief, Subi, 
and Fiery Cross Reefs, despite 
the PRC’s prior assurances 
that it would not militarize 
these facilities. And to com-
plicate the situation further, 
President Duterte stated in a 
speech that he believed China 
had installed the missiles to 
protect rather than imperil the Philippines.88
There is significant concern that President Duterte’s pro-China policies could 
provide a basis for turning Scarborough Shoal into another PRC air and naval 
base. Standing up to Beijing would require adept and forceful diplomacy from 
Manila, as well as the placement of U.S. Navy and Coast Guard assets at the shoal 
to counterbalance similar Chinese assets.
Farther south, China’s accelerated dredging and militarization of its artificial 
islands since 2013 violates its promises in the Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea, which it signed with ASEAN nations in 2002.89 
China’s naval outposts in the South China Sea include berthing for aircraft carri-
ers and submarines, runways sufficient for its military planes, antiaircraft guns, 
and—starting in 2018—ASCMs.90
The militarization of these islands, contradicting promises President Xi made 
to President Obama, is an increasingly powerful inhibitor of USN operations 
in the South China Sea. Counterintuitively, over time China’s militarization of 
the South China Sea increasingly has had the impact of forcing U.S. military 
commanders to get higher and higher levels of approval before being allowed to 
conduct routine operations in the South China Sea. This timidity has escalated to 
the point that presidential approval has been required for even simple freedom of 
navigation (FON) transits—an approval authority protocol that never had been 
required since the inception of the program in 1979.
Also in Southeast Asia, it is important to understand the dramatic tilt that the 
Kingdom of Thailand has taken toward the PRC. This tilt, particularly prominent 
While official Chinese documents describe the 
BRI as purely commercial and a win-win for 
participants, . . . internal PRC discussion of 
the BRI characterizes it as a stealthy conduit 
of political influence and not only maritime 
but also naval expansion.
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since the May 22, 2014, military coup in Thailand, is reflected in unprecedented 
Sino-Thai military-to-military training and cooperation� The first Sino-Thai na-
val exercises were held in the Andaman Sea in 2004 and in the Gulf of Thailand 
in 2005� Exercise STRIKE 2007 was the first joint exercise with any nation involv-
ing China’s special forces� Exercise BLUE STRIKE maritime drills commenced in 
2010, while the first Sino-Thai air force exercises, FALCON STRIKE, took place in 
2015� Thai officials have announced that the PRC will build a regional weapons 
and maintenance center in Thailand, and in 2017 Thailand purchased the first of 
three Chinese submarines�91
The submarine sale has serious, far-reaching implications� Not the least of 
these is that the PLAN likely will control a submarine maintenance and training 
facility at Sattahip naval base, which could preclude USN use of that important 
Southeast Asia naval facility�
Regarding China’s role in Malaysia, former prime minister Najib Razak visited 
China in 2014, and by the next year military personnel exchanges and joint ex-
ercises occurred between the Malaysian armed forces and the PLAN in the Strait 
of Malacca� In 2016, the two countries concluded a major military agreement, 
including Malaysia’s purchase of four littoral mission ships (LMSs), accompa-
nied by a statement by the prime minister against the United States� The LMS 
purchase was Malaysia’s first major defense deal with China, and it may include a 
new Malaysian office of China Shipbuilding and Offshore International Co� Ltd�, 
the LMS maker�92
In 2017, Malaysia’s defense minister spelled out the goals of the two countries 
as being an institutionalization of their “unique relationship” through a “high-
level defense committee” on military cooperation, intelligence exchange, educa-
tion, training, and strategic affairs� A “current issues” working group discussed 
the Malacca Strait, South China Sea, and terrorism� On his visit to Beijing that 
year, the minister oversaw an agreement between Malaysia’s National Defense 
University and Peking University�93
Also in 2017, a PLAN submarine docked at Malaysia’s naval base at Kota 
Kinabalu; this occurred simultaneously with a Russian antisubmarine warfare 
ship docking in the Philippines� Whether intentional or not, these actions sent a 
message about the strength of the alliance between China and Russia, along with 
a lack of any significant resistance to their influence in the region�94
After the Chinese and Russian visits in 2017, a fellow at the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences opined, “It is normal for Russia to increase the presence of its 
force in Southeast Asia as this region cannot be dominated by the U�S� Besides, 
Southeast Asia has seen a change in the balance of power� The influences of 
China and Russia in the region have heightened while the influence of the U�S� 
has declined� What’s more, with the U�S� failing to meet the security demands 
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of Southeast Asian countries, more countries in the region will turn to China 
and Russia for security�”95 Later in 2017, a PLAN Song-class submarine and a 
replenishment ship conducted a port call in Sabah, Malaysia, after conducting 
counterpiracy operations in Somalia—which sent another signal of the shifting 
sands in the South China Sea�96
Ceding Oceania in the Race for the Equator
As we focus on the PRC’s ability to break the first island chain, we also must be 
watching its inroads into the second and third island chains�97 Across the vast 
expanse of Oceania, China’s deepening economic and political relationships have 
paved the way for port leases and maritime construction efforts that serve the 
PRC’s global power-projection vision and threaten U�S� security interests�
China is making a large play for this resource-rich, strategically crucial region, 
from the continent of Australia to obscure island nations that most Americans 
might not recognize on a map� These are islands and waters that Americans de-
fended, or liberated island by bloody island, from brutal oppression more than 
seventy years ago� However, this time the outcome will be determined not only by 
U�S� naval and air power but also by who wins over the hearts and minds of local 
island populations� The reality at this moment is that massive Chinese investment 
to boost island economies is winning the hearts and minds of island leaders and 
well-off elites, if not necessarily populaces� Simultaneously, U�S� diplomatic and 
economic investment in the islands is often invisible, and sometimes even in 
retreat�
As a prime example, Australia, one of America’s closest allies, sold a ninety-
nine-year lease of its strategic port in Darwin to a financially distressed Chi-
nese company for $506 million in Australian dollars (AUD) in 2015� This sale 
occurred despite Darwin’s long and continuing usage by Australian and U�S� 
military forces, creating an enhanced security threat for operations and unpre-
dictability of access during a crisis� China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated 
at the time, “This investment by a Chinese enterprise is a normal business op-
eration that complies with market principles, international rules, and Australian 
laws�”98 But the Chinese company, Landbridge Group, was financially distressed 
and seeking cheap loans from the Chinese government� To obtain those loans, 
the chief executive officer described the port in terms consistent with China’s 
state goals, saying that the lease was part of China’s state-coordinated BRI� He 
also hired Australia’s former trade commissioner as a consultant for AUD 73,000 
per month, raising questions of corruption among Australia’s decision makers 
on the deal�99
China’s port in Darwin, Australia, is financially distressed� This is normal for 
China’s ports abroad, which are highly unprofitable—unless viewed from the 
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optic of China’s national security� Out of fifteen of China’s global port projects 
sampled by Devin Thorne and Ben Spevack, the authors concluded that “only 
six are arguably or potentially profitable�”100 Unsurprisingly, the authors included 
Darwin as one of these six ports, as the port could obtain subsidized funding from 
the Chinese government only after being linked with the PRC’s BRI� The BRI is 
unambiguously a project to promote Chinese global hegemony, both through 
political influence and, more concretely, through naval power projection�101
Recent media reports suggest that Australian defense officials are concerned 
that China aims to establish a permanent naval base on the Pacific island re-
public of Vanuatu, a country known for its robustly independent foreign policy� 
Vanuatu was the first Pacific nation to join the Non-Aligned Movement in the 
1980s, and it has a long-standing commitment to decolonization in places such 
as East Timor, West Papua, New Caledonia, and French Polynesia� Some see 
Vanuatu as the political capital of Melanesia, since it hosts the secretariat for the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) of nations� Vanuatu may be forging closer 
ties with China because it is being threatened directly by Indonesia as a result 
of Vanuatu’s support for West Papuan independence, and at the same time is in 
negotiations with France over the disputed territories of Matthew and Hunter 
Islands� Although Australia usually is seen as the primary regional security 
provider, Melanesian nations such as Vanuatu increasingly see their security 
situation as compromised when it comes to Canberra’s policies on Indonesia and 
climate change�102
While the Vanuatu government and the PRC currently deny that any plans to 
establish such a base are afoot, the PRC initially also denied its plans for the base 
in Djibouti�103 China already has built a new wharf on the Vanuatu island of Es-
piritu Santo, making it one of the largest ports in the South Pacific, and is upgrad-
ing the airport and building sports stadia, convention centers, and roads—along 
with office buildings for Vanuatu’s foreign affairs staff and the prime minister’s 
new office� Vanuatu would be a logical location for China to establish a new 
satellite-tracking station and ground-support facility for its Yuanwang space 
event support ships�104 Chinese officials stated that they have more aid projects 
active in Vanuatu than in any other Pacific country; in return, Vanuatu an-
nounced in late 2016 that it would be the first Pacific country to recognize China’s 
claims in the South and East China Seas� Since then, other Pacific nations, includ-
ing Nauru and Papua New Guinea, have followed suit�
At the same time that Chinese investment and diplomacy are spiking in Vanu-
atu, so too is investment in New Caledonia, where some French officials are ner-
vous about potential violence and the referenda on independence� Across Ocea-
nia, the PRC also is showing deep interest in the Federated States of Micronesia, 
Tonga, Samoa, and French Polynesia� The interest in French Polynesia stems 
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from these islands’ utility not only for support and monitoring (the Yuanwang 
ships have made several visits) but also as a refueling and transshipment point 
between China and the Americas� Additionally, China sees French Polynesia as a 
significant future stepping-stone to growing operations in Antarctica�105
A Chinese company has agreed to invest almost a third of a billion U�S� dollars 
to set up an aquaculture project at French Polynesia’s large and remote Hao atoll� 
That amount is more than all the foreign direct investment that French Polynesia 
received between 2013 and 2016 combined� The atoll used to support a French 
military base for France’s nuclear-testing program� While the base has closed, 
much of its infrastructure is still intact� This includes the airport, which has a 
runway long enough to have been designated an emergency landing strip for the 
space shuttle�106 Fiji and other politically complex countries that are diplomati-
cally close to China also might be in Beijing’s sights as possible locations for naval 
logistics facilities�107
Chinese influence operations in Oceania also are reflected closer to U�S� terri-
tory in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI)� In CNMI, 
just north of Guam, Chinese resort developers, serving PRC economic- and 
political-warfare interests, are stymieing U�S� military efforts to develop further 
a much-needed training area for amphibious operations, on Pagan Island� This 
thus-far-successful “blocking operation” is designed to degrade the readiness of 
frontline U�S� Navy and Marine Corps forces assigned or transiting there�
This now-well-established pattern to support Beijing’s global ambitions for the 
PLAN deserves Washington’s close attention� It starts with Chinese financial aid, 
political donations, and investment, along with commercial inroads, and then an 
increase in Chinese immigrants, all contributing to influence over local govern-
ments� Next, invariably, a PLAN-related military objective emerges� This angle 
can range from Chinese military access to ports and airfields to blocking efforts, 
as seen in CNMI and throughout Micronesia�108
New Threats in South Asia and the Indian Ocean
In recent years, the PRC has increased its influence and presence in South Asia 
significantly� Beijing is acquiring a naval facility near Gwadar, Pakistan, and a 
major maritime port facility in the same location on a forty-year lease� The first 
containership visited in March 2018, but Gwadar was not built exclusively for 
profit; rather, it also was envisioned to be China’s territorial foothold in Pakistan 
and to service naval power projection into the Arabian Sea�109
In Sri Lanka, Chinese companies gradually built their influence with arms sales 
amid a civil war and allegations of corruption and bribery at the highest levels� 
Vanity projects and growing debt predictably followed� From 2005 to 2014, China 
provided almost seven billion dollars in loans to Sri Lanka� By 2014, Sri Lanka 
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was having difficulty paying them back, and in September of that year it not only 
opened four of seven berths at the unprofitable Hambantota port to a Chinese 
company on a thirty-five-year lease but also hosted the PLAN warship Chang-
xingdao and nuclear submarine Changzheng-2� After an additional insolvency 
crisis in 2016, Sri Lanka sold a 70 percent equity stake in Hambantota to Chinese 
companies in exchange for forgiveness of a fraction of its debt to China� Chinese 
companies took control of the port, with a ninety-nine-year lease, in January 
2018� This port likely will see routine use by PLAN combatants early in the next 
decade, providing another indicator of the PRC’s success in achieving in the In-
dian Ocean region its goals for acquiring global power-projection capabilities�110
The Maldives provides another stark example� The country lurched toward 
Beijing (and away from New Delhi) with the election of a pro-PRC president in 
2013� The fractious aftermath of the hotly contested election led China to deploy 
warships in parts of the Indian Ocean to preserve its growing interests�111 Con-
sequently, the PRC has been granted exclusive trade and other access� In light 
of the Maldives’ strategic location south of India, this likely will lead to greatly 
enhanced PRC maritime surveillance and naval operational support�
The Maldives and Sri Lanka are two of the several Indian Ocean nations 
where China is obtaining footholds that could prove decisive in its future mari-
time strategy in the region� Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Myanmar also are 
being lured into China’s BRI� The PRC has a substantial stake in the deepwater 
Kyaukpyu port in Myanmar, identified by Chinese officials as one of several port 
locations for military supply and industry� In 2015, China’s state media described 
Kyaukpyu (Myanmar), Chittagong (Bangladesh), Colombo (Sri Lanka), Aden 
(Yemen), and ports in the Maldives as potential industrial hubs to support PLA 
military operations�112
While the facilities at Hambantota, Gwadar, and Kyaukpyu are not being used 
yet by the PLA, Beijing’s militarization of its man-made South China Sea facilities 
and the sudden prospect of a base in Vanuatu demonstrate how quickly dual-use 
infrastructure could be turned to military logistic support� The vulnerability of 
countries such as Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Vanuatu to Chinese debt traps associ-
ated with these infrastructure projects was highlighted recently by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund director, who suggested how easily Beijing might tighten 
the financial screws to obtain strategic access�113
Also of great concern, the Maldivian political crisis of 2013 exposed the PRC’s 
willingness to deploy the PLAN to the Indian Ocean in support of China’s inter-
ests, as described by Vivek Mishra:
Even as the crisis was unfolding, Chinese ships sailed to the East Indian Ocean com-
prising a fleet of destroyers and at least one frigate, a 30,000-ton amphibious trans-
port dock and three support tankers� The Chinese ships later returned to the South 
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China Sea on the back of heavy Indian naval scrambling� The incident, however, 
underscored the future importance of the Sunda Strait and the Lombok Strait, used 
for entry to and departure from the Indian Ocean, for the Chinese Navy (PLAN) in 
the event of a future maritime crisis in the Indian Ocean�114
Expanding Naval Interests in Africa
China has made naval and commercial shipping advances throughout Africa� 
These advances accelerated after Xi Jinping’s high-profile 2015 announcement of 
plans to invest sixty billion dollars in the continent� China has built or obtained 
leases for ports in the Horn of Africa (Djibouti), East Africa (Tanzania), and 
southern Africa on the Atlantic Ocean (Namibia)�
Most widely reported was China’s July 2017 establishment of a military 
logistics base in Djibouti� Here, China began its compromise of U�S� national 
security by softening up the government of Djibouti by providing a six-hundred-
million-dollar port terminal for multipurpose use, a four-billion-dollar terminal 
for liquefied natural gas exports, a six-hundred-million-dollar deal for two new 
airports, and a four-billion-dollar railroad� Chinese officials claimed not to be 
planning a military base for Djibouti—similar to the claims they have made 
in Vanuatu� But then, in July 2017, China used the influence its commerce had 
bought to open the Djibouti Logistics Support Base of the People’s Liberation 
Army near Doraleh, Djibouti� Officials then claimed that “the Djibouti base has 
nothing to do with an arms race or military expansion�”115
But the same month they opened the base, they were conducting live-fire 
exercises using armor, including wheeled tank destroyers and fighting vehicles, 
accompanied by infantry assault teams� These exercises had nothing to do with 
logistics, antipiracy, or the United Nations; rather, they established a land fight-
ing force in the Horn of Africa� The day after the exercises’ conclusion, Premier 
Li Keqiang met the Djiboutian president “to foster economic cooperation and to 
build a regional hub of trade and logistics,” according to China’s state media�116
Less than a year after the base opening in Djibouti, by early May 2018, there 
had been several incidents involving high-power military laser attacks against 
U�S� Air Force (USAF) pilots, a violation of U�S� federal law�117 Two pilots suffered 
minor eye injuries from the lasers that emanated from either the Chinese base 
at Djibouti or a Chinese naval vessel nearby� This is a tactic resurrected from 
the Cold War, when the Soviet Union conducted similar attacks against USAF 
pilots�118
In February 2018, the government of Djibouti also alienated the United States 
and its allies by terminating the port leases of Dubai’s DP World for the Doraleh 
Container Terminal (DCT)� China already controlled two of five terminals at Dji-
bouti’s seaport� The U�S� Africa Command (AFRICOM) chief since has expressed 
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concern that the DCT, which supplies U�S�, Japanese, Saudi, and French troops 
in Djibouti, could be turned over to China, putting at risk naval supply chains 
for the United States and its allies in the region, and possibly threatening USN 
access and commercial FON in the Red Sea and Suez Canal� Camp Lemonnier in 
Djibouti is the only USN base in Africa� Half the world’s containerized cargo and 
four million barrels of oil a day pass by Djibouti�119
The same year—and in stark contrast to the lasing events—the PLAN’s hospi-
tal ship, Anwei (Peace Ark), made port calls throughout the entire rim of Africa, 
which established important 
local contacts and provided 
logistic experience and public 
relations benefits to China� 
The PLAN mission lasted ap-
proximately a hundred days 
and covered 13,000 nm� The 
ship made port stops in Dji-
bouti, Sierra Leone, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo, Angola, Mozambique, 
and Tanzania�120
China’s naval presence already is progressing southward in East Africa� Tan-
zania is another illustration of China’s incremental insertion of its navy abroad� 
In 2011, the PLAN and Tanzania showed an increasingly close relationship by 
conducting joint naval training�121 China used World Bank funding to deepen 
and strengthen the port of Dar es Salaam in June 2017, which was a double win 
for China, as the PLAN’s largest warships then would be able to berth there and 
a Chinese company won a $154 million contract for the rebuild�122
A three-ship PLAN surface action group (a destroyer, a guided-missile frig-
ate, and a supply ship) visited Tanzania in August 2017�123 In November 2017, 
China used its growing influence in Tanzania to agree to a new $10 billion port 
contract for megaships (those carrying eight thousand twenty-foot equivalent 
units [TEUs]) in Bagamoyo, about seventy-five miles from Dar es Salaam�124 The 
high cost of the port relative to Tanzania’s small economy threatens to overwhelm 
its ability to repay debt to China incurred from port-construction costs� The 
port alone could add approximately 20 percent to Tanzania’s debt-to-GDP ratio, 
putting it at risk of debilitating concessions in an insolvency crisis, as Sri Lanka 
experienced�
In the 1960s, nationalist forces from Namibia visited Beijing to ask for guns 
and money in their fight against apartheid� In 1990, when Namibia claimed 
independence, China was one of the first to recognize the country diplomati-
cally� With that military, economic, and diplomatic investment flowed a hundred 
thousand Chinese immigrants into Namibia by 2016� Chinese corruption of local 
Beijing has demonstrated that it has the 
shipbuilding capacity, capabilities, untapped 
productivity gains, and global requirements to 
sustain the transformational growth in Chi-
nese naval construction and combat capability 
through 2030.
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Namibian politicians has led to international suspicion about plans for a potential 
PLA base on the Atlantic Ocean�125
In 2014, China Harbor Engineering Company began developing a $344 mil-
lion shipping terminal in Walvis Bay, Namibia, on the South Atlantic Ocean� 
Slated for completion in mid-2019, the terminal will have an artificial pen-
insula the size of forty baseball fields and two six-hundred-meter berths that 
each can accommodate containerized cargo vessels of eight thousand TEUs, 
for a total of 750,000 TEUs per year� The plan also includes a $400 million fuel 
depot—and rumors of a naval base� At a ceremony for delivery of four ship-to-
shore cranes in February 2018, China’s ambassador to Namibia stated that with 
their delivery, “Namibia’s port in the coastal town of Walvis Bay will become the 
most brilliant pearl on the Atlantic Coast of southwest Africa�” He added, “It 
can be said that this is the benchmark project for China-Namibia friendly and 
pragmatic cooperation, which symbolizes the great attention of our leaders to our 
relations and the brotherhood between our people�”126
This port is part of a larger Chinese presence in Namibia� Just forty-three 
kilometers (km) north of Walvis Bay is Swakopmund, Namibia, which hosts a 
Chinese telemetry station for tracking satellites and space missions� Chinese 
construction companies are building a new military academy 324 km northeast 
of Walvis Bay� China supplies weapons and training to the Namibian military, 
including from Poly Technologies, which also supplies Iran, Syria, and North 
Korea�127
About a hundred kilometers northeast of Walvis Bay is the Husab Uranium 
Mine, the world’s second largest� China General Nuclear (CGN) owns 90 percent 
of the mine, into which it has invested $4�6 billion since construction started in 
2013; the Namibian government owns only 10 percent� The mine and a process-
ing plant produce triuranium octoxide (U3O8), a yellowcake for both production 
of nuclear energy and weapons manufacture� The mine alone is economically, 
and therefore politically, important to the country, as it will increase Namibia’s 
GDP by 5 percent, according to its own estimates� Almost all Husab’s yellowcake 
production is planned for export to China out of the Walvis Bay port� CGN also 
builds nuclear reactors in China for export, and has proposed one for Namibia� 
CGN is trying to accelerate the manufacture and design of its nuclear reactor 
components� Notably, one of its American consultants was convicted in 2017 for 
conspiring to recruit U�S� nuclear engineers�128
By all accounts and indications, the PRC has selected Namibia as a strategic 
location, so U�S� national security policy makers should expect the PLAN to 
establish a naval base there in support of China’s global aspirations in the South 
Atlantic� The next logical area for expansion after Africa and the South Atlantic 
is in Europe and the North Atlantic�
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In 2017, China and Mauritius announced “a new strategic partnership” that 
included port access and much more� Mauritius is a small island nation to the east 
of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean� Judging by its own description, the Mauri-
tian government offered itself as a virtual shell country to China�
Minister Lutchmeenaraidoo emphasized that Chinese companies will be able to use 
the free port facilities in Mauritius as a basis for adding value to their products and 
re-export them under favorable conditions to [African] countries and can rely on 
Mauritius’ membership of organisations such as COMESA [Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa], SADC [Southern African Development Community], 
IOC [Indian Ocean Commission], and possibly the Tripartite Trade Zone (COMESA, 
SADC, East African Community) to reach markets [in the] countries of Southern 
Africa and East Africa, a huge market of some 650 million consumers�129
Mauritius is targeting countries such as Ghana, Senegal, and Madagascar for 
special economic zones, which they are offering as a sweetener to Chinese inves-
tors for government-to-government agreements “as a very attractive possibility 
to mobilise investments in these new economic poles�” In exchange, China appar-
ently dangled the opportunity to use Mauritius as an all-Africa hub of investment 
and for clearing Chinese currency�130 This dangling of “hub status” to countries 
throughout the world is a common tactic of China’s negotiators�
China Approaching American Coasts
This article has noted China’s naval and maritime expansion in terms of both 
ports and military basing in Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa, and the Indian 
Ocean�131 The examples illustrate that China’s ports are not really commercial 
ports, as Americans understand the term, because they are unprofitable; their real 
purpose is geopolitical and naval expansion�
Similarly, China’s merchant marine is not only a merchant marine but also an 
arm of state power on the seas� China used its merchant marine in coordinated 
fashion to evacuate Chinese citizens fleeing violence in Libya in 2011 and to 
threaten Vietnamese boats in their own EEZ in the 2014 China National Off-
shore Oil Corporation oil rig incident� This state coordination of commercial 
and military assets is a hallmark of China’s BRI—which is creeping ever closer to 
American shores�
With the Terminal Link purchase of 2013, Chinese companies purchased 49 
percent stakes in Houston Terminal Link, Texas, and South Florida Container 
Terminal in Miami, Florida� But China’s maritime tendrils are not limited to 
commercial ports�
China already has dispatched warships as far as Alaska� In 2015, the PLAN 
made its first trip there, with five ships, apparently seeking to intimidate Presi-
dent Obama when he made the first visit of a sitting president to Arctic Alaska� 
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The PLAN’s unexpected rendezvous with him should be seen as strategic mes-
saging, as well as a probable (if spurious) basis for a potential claim on Arctic 
resources in the future.132 In 2017, the PLAN again sailed to Alaska, on an ap-
parently uninvited intelligence-gathering mission to monitor U.S. testing of the 
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile-defense system.
In both instances, PLAN warships operated well within the U.S. EEZ and report-
edly near or within U.S. territorial waters. Ironically, as Chinese ships have begun 
to operate routinely inside the U.S. and other nations’ EEZs, the PRC vociferously 
complains whenever U.S. military ships operate within the South China Sea. As 
outlined in figure 3, since October 2015 the PLAN has shadowed nearly every USN 
warship that has entered and operated within the South China Sea, shifting from 
a “zone” coverage to a “man-to-man” strategy. This shift provides more empiri-
cal proof of the PRC’s intent to use its military forces to achieve its strategic goals 
through bullying and intimidation, despite assertions of peaceful development. 
Figure 3. PLAN Shift from “Zone” to “Man-to-Man” Coverage in South China Sea 
 
Source: Independent research by author, compiled from press reporting 
  
Notes: CSG = Carrier Strike Group, FONOP = freedom of navigation operation; SBL = straight baselines; SCS = South China Sea.
Source: Independent research by author, compiled from press reporting.
FIGURE 3
PLAN SHIFT FROM “ZONE” TO “MAN-TO-MAN” COVERAGE IN SOUTH CHINA SEA
 1. USS Lassen (Oct. 2015)—FONOP Subi Reef
 2. Stennis Carrier Strike Group (Mar. 2016)—CSG 
Ops SCS
 3. USS Curtis Wilbur (Jan. 2016)—FONOPs Triton 
Island
 4. USS William P. Lawrence (May 2016)—FONOPs 
Fiery Cross
 5. Stennis/Reagan CSGs (June/July 2016)—Dual 
CSG Ops SCS
 6. USS Decatur (Oct. 2016)—FONOPs Triton Island
 7. Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group (Feb. 2017)—
CSG Ops SCS
 8. USS Stethem (Apr. 2017)—Routine Operations in 
the SCS
 9. USS Dewey (May 2017)—FONOP Mischief Reef
 10. USS Stethem (July 2017)—FONOP Triton Island
 11. USS John S. McCain (Aug. 2017)—FONOP  
Mischief Reef
 12. USS Chafee (Oct. 2017)—SBL FONOP Paracel 
Island
 13. USS Hopper (Jan. 2018)—FONOP Scarborough 
Shoal
 14. USS Mustin (Mar. 2018)—FONOP Mischief Reef
Locations of each event are approximations based on press reporting.
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Regarding the PRC’s Arctic interests that portend impacts on U�S� territory and 
interests, in July 2017 the PRC and Russia agreed to “develop their cooperation on 
arctic shipping routes, jointly building a silk road on ice�” And less than a year later 
China’s State Council issued the country’s first Arctic white paper and continues 
to negotiate the outlines of potential cooperation and collaboration with Russia�133
China is pushing its military well into the Pacific, including to Guam and 
Hawaii, and into the Atlantic islands of the Azores� In 2017, the PLAN used 
intelligence-gathering ships to shadow joint U�S�-Australia naval exercises off 
the coast of Guam�134 China also has employed uninvited intelligence-gathering 
ships to spy on the U�S�-hosted Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises off Hawaii 
in 2012 and 2014�
In Brazil, China Merchant Port Holdings purchased a 90 percent stake in Bra-
zil’s most profitable port, TCP Participações SA, for $924 million in 2017�135 In 
Brazil’s state of Maranhão, Chinese companies laid foundation stones at the Port 
of São Luís in March 2018� A Chinese company holds a 51 percent stake in the 
$244 million port� The port will handle ten million tons of cargo, plus 1�8 million 
cubic meters of oil products� China’s ambassador to Brazil and the governor of 
Maranhão attended the ceremony for the BRI project�136
The PLAN is operating hydrographic research ships in the South Atlantic—a 
harbinger of future PLAN submarine operations in the North Atlantic, which 
could begin by 2025� While the U�S� air base in the Azores was home to the USAF 
65th Air Base Wing and was critical to fighting World War II, the Cold War, and 
the Iraq war, by 2015 U�S� personnel there had been reduced to only two hundred, 
causing a cash crunch for locals—and providing a major strategic opportunity 
for China’s military�137 China made moves to scout berthing in the Azores that 
year� A Chinese naval and air base in the Azores would be a third of the way to 
the U�S� East Coast from Portugal, providing PLAN ships and submarines and 
PLAAF planes a strategic basing location to cover the East Coast of the continen-
tal United States�
FUTURE PRC NAVAL FORCE ESTIMATE
What, then, does this vast PLAN maritime mission mean for Chinese naval 
construction over the next fifteen years? It means that in twelve years the PLAN 
most likely will have twice as many warships and submarines as the U�S� Navy� 
It means the PRC will be able to conduct successful naval missions on a scale 
that, until recently, was deemed implausible by the most senior leaders of the 
Intelligence Community� Beijing has demonstrated that it has the shipbuilding 
capacity, capabilities, untapped productivity gains, and global requirements to 
sustain the transformational growth in Chinese naval construction and combat 
capability through 2030�
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The ONI’s most recent study (exhibit 1) reports that the PLAN consists of 
over 330 surface vessels and sixty-six submarines�138 Given the increasing PRC 
shipbuilding capacity and capabilities outlined above, it is likely that by 2030 the 
PLAN surface force could approach 450 hulls and ninety-nine total submarines 
(exhibit 2), a growth rate of 30 percent and 50 percent, respectively, compared 
with approximately 15 percent for overall 2000–15 PLAN growth�139 This ex-
pected force would satisfy the requirements for fleet expansion to meet Beijing’s 
“goal of rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation�”140 
To achieve the China Dream, the PLAN of 2030 will not resemble the PLAN 
of 2015� Rather, it will enjoy a global presence characterized by multiple strike 
groups, a credible SLBM capability, and an ever-present network of ships at sea� 
Thanks to the strength of its naval shipbuilding capacity and its commitment 
to national rejuvenation, the PLAN will present an expansive and formidable 
challenge—one the United States can ill afford to underestimate or ignore�
THE COMING DECADE OF CONCERN
In his March 2018 speech to the National People’s Congress, President Xi Jinping 
stated as follows:
Platform Inventory
Destroyers  26 (21 modern)
Frigates  52 (35 modern)
Corvettes  20 (all modern)
Missile patrol craft 85 (60 modern)
Amphibious ships  56
Mine-warfare ships  42 (30 modern)
Major auxiliaries  50+
Total surface combatants  331+
SSNs  5
SSBNs  4
SSs  57
Total submarines  66
Notes: SS = attack submarine, conventionally powered; SSBN = ballistic-
missile submarine, nuclear-powered; SSN = attack submarine, nuclear-
powered.
Source: Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy.
EXHIBIT 1
PLAN 2015—CURRENT PLATFORM  
INVENTORY
Platform Inventory
Destroyers  34
Frigates  68
Corvettes  26
Missile patrol craft  111
Amphibious ships  73
Mine-warfare ships  55
Major auxiliaries  65+
Total surface combatants 432+
SSNs  12
SSBNs  12
SSs  75
Total submarines 99
Notes: SS = attack submarine, conventionally powered; SSBN = ballistic-
missile submarine, nuclear-powered; SSN = attack submarine, nuclear-
powered.
Source: Author’s calculations based on multiple sources.
EXHIBIT 2
PLAN 2030—FORECAST PLATFORM  
INVENTORY
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Since modern times began, to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation has 
become the greatest dream of the Chinese nation� � � � With the spirit of fighting the 
enemy to the last minute, the resolve of recovering the lost on the basis of self- 
reliance � � � the Chinese people have made continuous efforts for more than 170 years 
to fulfill the great dreams� Today, we are closer, more confident, and more capable 
than ever before in making the goal of national rejuvenation a reality�141
As it relates to the restoration of China’s perceived territory President Xi made 
this statement:
It is the shared aspiration of all Chinese people and in the fundamental interests of 
the Chinese nation to safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and real-
ize China’s complete reunification� In front of the great national interests and the tide 
of history, any actions and tricks to split China are doomed to fail� They are certain 
to meet with the people’s condemnation and the punishment by the history [sic]� The 
Chinese people have the resolve, the confidence, and the ability to defeat secessionist 
attempts in any form! The Chinese people and the Chinese nation share a common 
belief that it is never allowed and it is absolutely impossible to separate any inch of 
territory of our great country from China!142
It is clear that President Xi and the CCP firmly believe that the PRC has not 
yet reached national rejuvenation, and therefore they are on a timeline to achieve 
this goal� President Xi stated that the CCP “has drawn up a splendid blueprint” 
to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation�”143 And, as with most 
blueprints, there is an element of time, which President Xi specifically references 
in the following statement: “[A]lthough we have a long way to go, we are left with 
limited time and not allowed to be slack� We must not be satisfied with the status 
quo, indulge ourselves in ease and comfort, or let delight dispel worries�”144
Given Xi’s clearly articulated goal for the PRC’s great rejuvenation, which in-
cludes the restoration of its perceived territory, the obvious question is: How long 
will the PRC wait? It is my assertion, on the basis of all available evidence, that 
China desires to celebrate the complete restoration of the PRC by the hundredth 
anniversary of its establishment, in 2049�
If so, the next logical question is: What will happen if Beijing is unable to 
achieve complete restoration via nonviolent means? Or, to put it another way, 
regarding such regional disputes as those over the Senkakus and the sovereignty 
of Taiwan, what if Japan or Taiwan resists? How long will it be before the PRC’s 
rulers believe they have to use military force to achieve their ultimate goal of 
national restoration?
The answers to these questions also will help drive the PRC’s timelines for 
establishing its global hegemony� The CCP will seek to ensure its uncontested 
ability to dominate political, diplomatic, and military discourse globally, not only 
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in support of its BRI, but also prior to using military force to settle the Senkakus 
and Taiwan issues on its terms.
In my estimation, the answer is as early as 2020, but likely no later than 2030—
a period that I have labeled “the decade of concern” (see figure 4). 
China very likely has calculated a timeline for when it could use military 
force at the latest possible moment and still be able to conduct a grand ceremony 
celebrating its national restoration in 2049. A likely template for calculating that 
date would be the period from Tiananmen Square to the 2008 Olympics. China’s 
leaders remember well that in 1989 the international community largely con-
demned Beijing’s brutal slaughtering of its own citizens at Tiananmen Square, 
yet just nineteen years later the world’s leaders—including the president of the 
United States—eagerly flocked to Beijing to attend the opening ceremony of the 
2008 Olympic Games. That president later described the event as being “spec-
tacular and successful.”145
What was the strategic message from this event? It reinforced a belief among 
China’s leadership that the United States has a short attention span regarding the 
use of force. In short, Beijing believes the West can be counted on to forget even 
Figure 4: The Decade of Concern, 2020–30 
 
Source: Captain James E. Fanell, USN (Ret.) 
  
FIGURE 4
THE DECADE OF CONCERN, 2020–30
Source: Captain James E. Fanell, USN (Ret.).
We cannot wait forever for a political solution  
to Taiwan. – PRC President Xi Jinping, October  
2013, at APEC Forum
7260_Fanell_LEAD.indd   45 12/12/18   11:11 AM
35
Fanell: Asia Rising: China’s Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force St
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 4 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
the most barbarous actions after a roughly twenty-year time span� Given that 
logic, the latest Beijing could use military force to restore China’s perceived ter-
ritory physically would be around 2030� This would then allow for twenty years 
of “peace” before Beijing would conduct a grand ceremony to memorialize the 
“second 100”—the hundredth anniversary of the PRC� This again leads to the 
question: When is the earliest China could use military power?
Given the current environment and readiness of the PLA, such use could start 
at any time� However, as referenced earlier, intelligence analysis strongly indicates 
that during the past decade the PLA has been given the strategic task of taking 
Taiwan by force by 2020� If it is able to do that, it stands to reason that the lesser 
task of seizing the Senkaku Islands also would be achievable�
With the decade of concern beginning in 2020, it is my estimation that there 
will be mounting pressure within China to use military force to achieve the China 
Dream of national restoration by 2049� There will be a loud chorus for the use of 
force, which will grow each year and will crescendo in the late 2020s, ending in 
a violent clash to seize Taiwan, the Senkakus, and any other area Beijing deems 
to be a core interest�
In this decade of concern, an increasingly capable PLAN, as directed by a CCP 
greatly emboldened by its power and the lack of resistance to its expansionist 
global aspirations, will engage in operations in all the oceans of the world� It is 
entirely foreseeable that these PLAN operations will include activities designed to 
coerce, intimidate, and ultimately even defeat at sea the United States, our allies, 
and our friends�
RECOMMENDATIONS
First and foremost, I believe there must be, as James Holmes recently wrote, a 
fundamental transformation in the “culture” of how we deal with China, to one 
that recognizes that country as the main threat to U�S� national security, princi-
pally because of the strategic trend line that will grant the PLAN the ability to 
control the oceans of the world�146
Achieving this cultural change is a national issue, and the effort to do so is 
being driven from the top� The new National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Na-
tional Defense Strategy call out the PRC for being a “revisionist power�” Standing 
up to Beijing is not irresponsible or irrational, especially given that China’s ac-
tions are targeting the United States (and our fleet) despite President Xi’s pledge 
that the PRC is devoted to a “community with a shared future for mankind” and 
“mutual respect, fairness, justice, and win-win cooperation�”147
Second, the administration should declare unambiguously that U�S�-China 
relations have entered a new period of competition, as stated in the NSS, and then 
take the steps needed to compete� We must, of course, walk our talk� To this end, 
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our strategic communications need to be strengthened greatly and organizations 
need to be given specific authority and direction to fight and win on the informa-
tion battlefield�
America must deal with the PRC now from a position of strength, one from 
which we can assert our core interests and principles just as firmly as, if not more 
firmly than, the PRC asserts its core interests and principles� This means no more 
acquiescing to PRC demands; no more being quiet when the Chinese ignore the 
rule of law, as they have done with regard to the July 12, 2016, PCA ruling; and 
no more subordinating U�S� national interests to worries about whether we are 
provoking China�
Beijing is using incremental strategies and political warfare very effectively to 
gain maritime territory, and in the process to destroy the trust of our allies� Wash-
ington must be willing to confront Beijing’s bullying even at the risk of military 
conflict, especially since Beijing purposefully fosters fear among the Western 
academic China-watching community as a tool to manipulate us in our military, 
economic, and diplomatic strategies� For instance, as part of our messaging, we 
regularly—whenever we wish—should conduct carrier operations anywhere 
within the first island chain� In fact, we should increase our presence, with the 
adoption of a permanent 2�0 presence in the western Pacific�
Third, this new relationship also means recalibrating our one-China policy, 
and very publicly highlighting the U�S� interpretation of the term—what it means 
and what it does not mean� To this end, we have to refute, visibly and verbally, 
the PRC’s constraints on our relationship with Taiwan� This means discarding 
years of constraints our own bureaucrats have imposed� For example, the no-
tion that U�S� warships cannot make the occasional port call in Taiwan needs to 
be scrapped; nowhere is this self-defeating prohibition enshrined in any treaty, 
agreement, or law� Therefore—after discussion with our friends in Taiwan— 
we should make a port call, and we should do it without fanfare or advance 
notification�
To disrupt Beijing’s strategic schedule, the United States must keep China 
on its back foot, and that requires strategic unpredictability on our part� The 
message to China is that freedom of navigation and free access to ports is a core 
interest of the United States of America, and we are not going to be constrained 
by Beijing’s threats�
Also to this end, we must end the practice of “unconstrained engagement” 
by the Department of Defense� Encouragingly, the fiscal year 2019 National 
Defense Authorization Act, signed on August 13, 2018, includes a specific policy 
barring the PLAN from participating in any future RIMPAC exercises unless the 
Secretary of Defense grants a waiver� This constitutes a direct response to China’s 
decades of aggressive and expansionistic behavior in the South China Sea� The 
Winter2019Review.indb   47 12/4/18   11:13 AM
37
Fanell: Asia Rising: China’s Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force St
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 4 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
United States is making a clear statement that China’s bad behavior no longer will 
be rewarded with such privileges; to do otherwise simply makes a mockery of our 
foreign policy positions in Asia, if not around the globe�
Fourth, and closely aligned with the preceding, the administration must pro-
claim its commitment to a forward-deployed presence, especially for our naval 
forces� Not only is this necessary for bolstering the flagging confidence of our 
allies; it also sends a clear and unambiguous statement to China� Options can 
range from homeporting a second carrier in the western Pacific (i�e�, Guam) to 
homeporting ships in South Korea�
This visible commitment 
to for ward presence also 
means halting any further re-
duction of U�S� Marine Corps 
forces in Asia� Every time we 
vacillate in defense of our for-
ward presence we succumb to 
the PRC’s PW strategy; in essence, we hand China a victory and perpetuate its 
myth that China is in ascension and America in decline�
Fifth, the United States must commit to conducting more-robust and more-
public maritime intelligence operations� While much progress has been made in 
improving our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities in the 
Indo-Pacific region, as reflected by the introduction of the P-8 aircraft, we con-
currently have displayed a lack of will to expose the PRC’s aggressive actions in 
the maritime domain� This requires the United States to get serious about its stra-
tegic communications, in terms of mission, organization, policy, and doctrine�
Why, for instance, during the inaugural deployment of China’s aircraft carrier 
Liaoning, did the U�S� Indo-Pacific Command, which conducted intelligence re-
connaissance flights, fail to provide unclassified pictures of China’s inaugural car-
rier flight operations in the deep blue sea? This same reluctance characterized our 
approach to China’s building of the seven new artificial islands� Why?
The sharing of facts about Chinese activities at sea is not only good for trans-
parency in a democracy but is also smart military strategy, as it imposes repu-
tational costs on the PRC for its military adventurism� Moreover, making such 
information widely available would help to counter spurious Chinese narratives 
of American actions as being the root cause of instability in the western Pacific� 
Both outcomes are in our national interest�
However, we have no unified national policy to develop and execute strategic 
communications in this era of competition, and there is no unity of effort� For 
example, the funding allotted to the State Department for counter-PW opera-
tions has been diverted almost exclusively to countering Russian propaganda, 
America must deal with the PRC now from a 
position of strength, one from which we can 
assert our core interests and principles just as 
firmly as, if not more firmly than, the PRC as-
serts its core interests and principles.
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with the seemingly conscious exclusion of countering PRC influence operations� 
Further, as a rule, neither Department of Defense nor Department of State public 
affairs practitioners study PRC influence operations and political warfare at the 
Defense Information School or the Foreign Service Institute, as the leadership in 
those organizations does not seem to understand the urgency of including such 
training in the curriculum�
Sixth, we must return to naval nuclear-deterrence operations� The harsh real-
ity is that China’s nuclear ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs, also known as 
boomers) now can range all of the United States, including the capital� Given the 
presumption that the PRC already has begun SSBN patrols and to mitigate the 
risk of a sea-launched nuclear ballistic-missile attack against the United States, 
the U�S� Navy must be able to hold at risk all adversarial nations’ patrolling 
SSBNs, at all times� To hold at risk means that every time PLAN SSBNs depart 
on strategic nuclear patrols, the U�S� Navy must follow them closely enough to be 
ready to sink them if they ever attempt to launch nuclear-tipped intercontinental 
ballistic missiles toward our shores� Chinese boomers are not so loud that if a 
crisis began we would, with high certainty, be able to find them�
This leads to the seventh recommendation—and the proverbial elephant in 
the room� All the above recommendations make it obvious that the U�S� Navy 
must increase in size� Roger Wicker and Jerry Hendrix’s recent article entitled 
“How to Make the U�S� Navy Great Again” states as follows:
From a naval perspective, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is 
pursuing a mix of high-end and low-end ships and submarines� This strategy would 
allow the PLAN to spread out across the vast Pacific Ocean in sufficient numbers to 
locate and interdict U�S� ships� At the high end, China is investing in aircraft carriers, 
nuclear-powered fast-attack submarines and large surface combatants equipped  
with advanced radars, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and surface-to-surface  
missiles� � � � Backed by a growing arsenal of longer-range and more sophisticated air 
and missile weapons, the Chinese navy will have a highly capable and numerically 
larger maritime force by the middle of the next decade� If this situation comes to frui-
tion, it could make the projection of U�S� naval power cost prohibitive in the western 
Pacific, undermining the credibility of our alliance commitments�148 
Given my estimate that the future size of the PLAN will be about 550 warships 
and submarines by 2030—twice the size of today’s U�S� Navy—it is clear the U�S� 
Navy is at great risk of not being adequately sized or outfitted to meet American 
national security commitments in the Indo-Pacific, let alone around the globe� 
Therefore, to accomplish all the above missions, to provide a credible deterrent 
against PRC hegemony, and to be able to fight and win wars at sea, the U�S� 
Navy must get bigger� The evidence that a strategic gap between the U�S� Navy 
and the PLAN is on the verge of exploding over the next decade and a half is 
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overwhelming� Because of this gap, it seems clear to me that to keep even a modi-
cum of parity with the Chinese the U�S� Navy will require more than 355 ships�
The bottom line is that America needs to get back to being a maritime power 
supported militarily by strong allies—something that has been sorely neglected 
since the fall of the Soviet Union� Without that accomplishment, expect China 
to push us ever farther from Asia� Expect to lose more allies and influence across 
the Indo-Pacific� And, ultimately, expect to be seen as globally irrelevant, with 
all the negative consequences for our national security interests and the defense 
of our values�
We already have slipped� If we fall any further, we may not recover�
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